Publications of Sebastian Kube

Suri, D., Bongers, N., & Kube, S. (2025). Is pro-environmental effort affected by information about others’ behavior? Ecological Economics, 228

Engel, C., Kube, S., & Kurschilgen, M. (2021). Managing expectations: How selective information affects cooperation and punishment in social dilemma games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 187, 111–136

Goerg, S., Kube, S., & Radbruch, J. (2019). The Effectiveness of Incentive Schemes in the Presence of Implicit Effort Costs. Management Science, 65(9), 4063–4078

Albrecht, F., & Kube, S. (2018). Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game. Games, 9(3)

Albrecht, F., Kube, S., & Traxler, C. (2018). Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: The Individual-Level Perspective. Journal of Public Economics, 165, 1–16

Glöckner, A., Kube, S., & Nicklisch, A. (2018). The joint benefits of observed and unobserved social sanctions. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 75, 105–116

Frackenpohl, G., Hillenbrand, A., & Kube, S. (2016). Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames. Experimental Economics, 19(4), 842–863

Kube, S., Khachatryan, E., & Vollan, B. (2015). Mitigating Extortive Corruption? Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economics and Statistics, 235(2), 228–241

Kube, S., Schaube, S., Schildberg-Hörisch, H., & Khachatryan, E. (2015). Institution formation and cooperation with heterogenous agents. European Economic Review, 78, 248–268

Beckenkamp, M., Engel, C., Glöckner, A., Irlenbusch, B., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Kube, S., … Towfigh, E. V. (2014). First Impressions are More Important than Early Intervention. Qualifying Broken Windows Theory in the Lab. International Review of Law and Economics, 37, 126–136

Corazzini, L., Kube, S., Maréchal, M. A., & Bernasconi, M. (2014). Elections and Deceptions. American Journal of Political Science, 58, 579–592

Kube, S., Klor, E., Winter, E., & Zultan, R. (2014). Can higher rewards lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 97, 72–83

Kube, S., & Aretz, B. (2013). Choosing Your Object of Benevolence: A Field Experiment on Donation Options. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115, 62–73

Kube, S., Puppe, C., & Maréchal, M. A. (2013). Do Wage Cuts Damage Work Morale? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 853–870

Kube, S., Puppe, C., & Maréchal, M. A. (2012). The Currency of Reciprocity – Gift Exchange in the Workplace. American Economic Review, 102, 1644–1662

Abeler, J., Altmann, S., Goerg, S. J., Kube, S., & Wibral, M. (2011). Equity and Efficiency in Multi-Worker Firms – Insights from Experimental Economics. Analyse und Kritik, 33, 325–347

Glöckner, A., Irlenbusch, B., Kube, S., Nicklisch, A., & Normann, H.-T. (2011). Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super Privileged Player. Economic Inquiry, 49, 591–597

Kube, S., & Traxler, C. (2011). The interaction of legal and social norm enforcement. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13, 639–660

Abeler, J., Altmann, S., Kube, S., & Wibral, M. (2010). Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness Concerns: When Equality is Unfair. Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 8(6), 1299-1324., 8, 1299–1324

Goerg, S. J., Kube, S., & Zultan, R. (2010). Treating Equals Unequally – Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology. Journal of Labor Economics, 28, 747–772

Kube, S., Abeler, J., Altmann, S., & Wibral, M. (2010). When Equality Is Unfair – Reciprocity and Payment Modes in a Principal-Multi-Agent Experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, 1299–1324

Kube, S., Bernasconi, M., Corazzini, L., & Maréchal, M. A. (2009). Two are better than One! Individuals’ Contributions to "Unpacked" Public Goods. Economics Letters, 104, 31–33

Kube, S., & Kaiser, J. (2009). Behavioral Finance meets Experimental Macroeconomics: On the Determinants of Currency Trade Decisions. Journal of Behavioral Finance, 10, 44–54

Kube, S., & Puppe, C. (2009). (When and How) Do Voters Try to Manipulate? Experimental Evidence from Borda Elections. Public Choice, 139, 39 ff.

Kube, S., Selten, R., von Hagen, J., & Pope, R. (2008). Experimental Evidence on the Benefits of Eliminating Exchange Rate Uncertainties. Indian Journal of Economics and Business, 7, 1–31

Kube, S., Selten, R., Chmura, T., Pitz, T., & Schreckenberg, M. (2007). Experiments and Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour. Games and Economic Behavior, 58, 394–406

Kube, S., Puppe, C., Pitz, T., & Chmura, T. (2005). Testing (Beliefs about) Social Preferences: Evidence from an Experimental Coordination Game. Economics Letters, 88, 214–220

Goerg, S. J., Kube, S., Radbruch, J., & Weinschenk, P. (2016). Do teams procrastinate? Strategic procrastination in a dynamic environment. In S. J. Goerg & J. Hamann (Eds.), Experiments in Organizational Economics, Research In Experimental Economics, 19, 229–250. Emerald Group Publishing

Goerg, S. J., & Kube, S. (2010). The equity principle in employment relationships. In A. Ockenfels & A. Sadrieh (Eds.), The Selten School of Behavioral Economics – A Collection of Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, 204–219. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer

Kube, S., Schreckenberg, M., & Selten, R. (2004). Experimental Investigation of Day-to-Day Route-Choice Behaviour and Network Simulations of Autobahn Traffic in North Rhine-Westphalia. In M. Schreckenberg (Ed.), Human Behaviour and Traffic Networks, 1–22. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer

Kleine, M., & Kube, S. (2015). Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Goerg, S. J., & Kube, S. (2012). Goals (th)at Work – Goals, Monetary Incentives, and Workers’ Performance. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Engel, C., Kube, S., & Kurschilgen, M. (2011). Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experiment. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Glöckner, A., Kube, S., & Nicklisch, A. (2011). The Joint Benefits of Observed and Unobserved Punishment: Comment to Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Beckenkamp, M., Engel, C., Glöckner, A., Irlenbusch, B., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Kube, S., … Towfigh, E. V. (2009). First Impressions are More Important than Early Intervention. Qualifying Broken Windows Theory in the Lab. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Engel, C., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., & Kube, S. (2009). On Probation. An Experimental Analysis. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Glöckner, A., Irlenbusch, B., Kube, S., Nicklisch, A., & Normann, H.-T. (2009). Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods