Research of Peter Cramton on Spectrum Auctions

Professor Cramton is among the most widely cited authors on spectrum auctions. Five of the top-ten articles in the Google Scholar search “spectrum auctions” point to articles he has authored.

Professor Cramton has written 51 papers on or closely related to spectrum auctions. This work appears below. The full text of all papers is available at www.cramton.umd.edu.

1. “The German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and Behaviour” (with Axel Ockenfels), Economic Journal, 127, F305-F324, October 2017.
2. “Open Access Wireless Markets” (with Linda Doyle), Telecommunications Policy, 41:5-6, 379-390, June 2017.
3. “An Open Access Wireless Market” (with Linda Doyle), Working Paper, University of Maryland, 6 January 2016.
4. “Design of the Reverse Auction in the FCC Incentive Auction” (with Hector Lopez, David Malec and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Working Paper, University of Maryland, 15 June 2015; Appendix.
5. “Bidding and Prices in the AWS-3 Auction” (with Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Working Paper, University of Maryland, May 2015.
6. “Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,” (with Lawrence M. Ausubel, Marek Pycia, Marzena Rostek, and Marek Weretka) Review of Economic Studies, 81:4, 1366-1400, 2014.
7. “Spectrum Auction Design,” Review of Industrial Organization, 42:2, 161-190, March 2013.
8. “Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions” (with Robert Day), Operations Research, 60:3, 588-603, 2012.
9. “Activity Rules for the Combinatorial Clock Auction” (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Working Paper, University of Maryland, November 2011.
10. “Incentive Auctions and Spectrum Policy,” Testimony of Peter Cramton before the United States House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 15 July 2011.
11. “Incentive Auctions,” Working Paper, University of Maryland, April 2011.
12. “Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services” (with Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, and Andrzej Skrzypacz), Journal of Law and Economics, 54:4, S167-S188, 2011.
13. “Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction” (with Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Decision Analysis, 7, 40-57, 2010.
14. “Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study” (with Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Ozbay, and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Experimental Economics, 15, forthcoming, 2012.
15. “Auctioning the Digital Dividend,” in Jan Kramer and Stefan Seifert (eds.), Communications Regulation in the Age of Digital Convergence: Legal and Economic Perspectives, Karlsruhe, Germany: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, 2009.
16. “How Best to Auction Natural Resources,” in Philip Daniel, Brenton Goldsworthy, Michael Keen, and Charles McPherson (eds.), Handbook of Oil, Gas And Mineral Taxation, Chapter 10, forthcoming, Washington, DC: IMF, 2009.
17. “A Review of the 10-40 GHz Auction,” Office of Communications, United Kingdom, September 2008.
18. “A Review of the L-Band Auction,” Office of Communications, United Kingdom, September 2008.
19. “Innovation and Market Design.” In Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, National Bureau of Economic Research, 113-137, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
20. “Market Design: Auctions and Matching.” In John Siegfried (ed.), Better Living Through Economics, Harvard University Press, 223-225, 2010.
21. “The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry” (with Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson), submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 13 November 2007.
22. “Comments on the FCC’s Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73” (with Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, and Robert Wilson), 31 August 2007.
23. “An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions” (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg), ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 7, 3-14, 2007.
24. “The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35” (with Allan T. Ingraham and Hal J. Singer) Telecommunications Policy, 32, 273-290, 2008.
25. Economist Letter to NTIA on 700 MHz Spectrum Auction (with Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, and Robert Wilson), 30 July 2007.
26. “Essential Entry: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction,” University of Maryland, 13 July 2007.
27. “Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction” (with Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson), Working Paper, University of Maryland, 27 June 2007.
28. “Economic Comments on the Design of the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction” (with Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson), submitted with testimony of James L. Barksdale to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 14 June 2007.
29. Combinatorial Auctions, (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg) MIT Press, 2006.
30. “The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design,” (with Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom) in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 5, 115-138, MIT Press, 2006.
31. “Simultaneous Ascending Auctions,” in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 4, 99-114, MIT Press, 2006.
32. “Auctioning Many Divisible Goods,” (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 480-493, April-May 2004.
33. “Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing,” (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Economic Theory, 23, 493-505, April 2004. Reprinted in Charalambos Aliprantis, et al. (eds.), Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 355-368, 2003.
34. “Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions,” (with Jesse Schwartz) Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, 1:1, www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art11, 2002.
35. “Spectrum Auctions,” in Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar, and Ingo Vogelsang, eds., Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., Chapter 14, 605-639, 2002.
36. “How Affirmative Action at the FCC Auctions Decreased the Deficit,” (with Ian Ayres) in Ian Ayres, ed., Pervasive Prejudice? Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 315-395, 2001. 
37. “Lessons Learned from the UK 3G Spectrum Auction.” In U.K. National Audit Office Report, The Auction of Radio Spectrum for the Third Generation of Mobile Telephones, Appendix 3, October 2001.
38. “Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions,” (with Jesse Schwartz) Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 229-252, May 2000.
39. “The Optimality of Being Efficient,” (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Working Paper, University of Maryland, March 2001.
40. Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding, (with John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, and Robert Wilson) Report to the Federal Communications Commission, March 1998.
41. “Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents,” (with Evan Kwerel and John Williams) Journal of Law and Economics, 41, 647-675, October 1998.
42. “Ascending Auctions,” European Economic Review, 42:3-5, 745-756, May 1998.
43. “The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions,” Journal of Law and Economics, 41, 727-736, October 1998.
44. Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses, (with John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, and Robert Wilson) Report to the Federal Communications Commission, October 1997.
45. Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions, (with John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, and Robert Wilson) Report to the Federal Communications Commission, September 1997.
46. “The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6:3, 431-495, 1997. Reprinted in Donald L. Alexander (ed.), Telecommunications Policy, Praeger Publishers, 1997.
47. “Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions,” (with Lawrence M. Ausubel, R. Preston McAfee, and John McMillan) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6:3, 497-527, 1997. [Data]
48. “Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition,” (with Ian Ayres) Stanford Law Review, 48:4, 761-815, 1996.
49. “Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 4, 267–343, 1995.
50. “The Case for Affirmative Auction: From Conscience to Coffers,” (with Ian Ayres) New York Times, 21 May 1995, F13.
51. “Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently,” (with Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer) Econometrica, 55, 615–632, 1987. Reprinted in Paul Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, Volume 2, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000.